‘Putting the Cart Before the Horse?’: Why the movement for Rights of Nature has seen greater success than Nonhuman Animal Rights movement

The few successes for nonhuman personhood is due to the traditional approach taken by its proponents, which aims to achieve revolutionary change in a single case. Instead of pushing for a ground-breaking ruling, legal personhood would be better achieved as a by-product of creating more fundamental rights for nonhuman animals. The success of the rights of nature, point to non-judicial routes as the more appropriate method. This approach avoids the need for a predetermined legal basis, instead encouraging progression through increasingly legally visible legislative change.

JAMIE FINCH: Legal personhood is a term that carries significant power, acknowledging a being, or entity, as having intrinsic value. Such status merits the granting of personal rights, making it a target for various legal scholars advocating for the rights of those considered nonpersons. Nonhuman animal rights scholars are no exception, but they have rarely met this goal. In contrast, the movement to give rights to nature has gained traction, with multiple natural objects recognised as legal persons. This article asserts that the comparatively few successes for nonhuman persons, owe to the traditional approach taken by scholars, which aims to achieve revolutionary change in a single case. Instead of pushing for a ground-breaking ruling, legal personhood would be better achieved as a by-product of creating more fundamental rights for nonhuman animals…

Although there are comprehensive bodies of literature assessing the status of both nonhuman animals and natural objects, few use the different stages of progress within their analysis. This dissertation draws upon the success of the rights of nature movement to offer support for its thesis, given its avoidance of arguments that have proven to be barriers to nonhuman animal legal personhood. A transitional approach can overcome such barriers for similar reasons, providing a valuable alternative path towards nonhuman animal legal personhood, and all it is equated with…

While scholars adopting the traditional approach are eager to achieve animal personhood, the ‘black-and-white’ thinking that comes with this school of thought is slowing progress. Rejecting arguments recognising rights already available to nonhuman animals, these scholars are missing the opportunity to use an established legal basis on which to build. A rejection of simple rights also complicates any explanation of how nonhuman animals have a capacity for rights, complimenting interpretations of rights jurisprudence that hold that for a right one must have the capability to bear duties. Instead, too much reliance is given to the likeness of some nonhuman animals, and for a status untailored to its subject. Without legal basis, the solely judicial route is further limited in its effectiveness, with courts reluctant to make decisions with uncertain consequences.

Notwithstanding these criticisms, the positive impacts of the work done by Wise and the NhRP should not go unnoticed. The increased visibility given to the issue of animal personhood within public and academic communities contributes to the changing of attitudes, important for building on existing protections. Albeit not bringing about the goals of the traditional approach, this work is therefore playing a part in a bigger shift towards animal personhood.This critique is helpful to understand why there has been comparatively fewer successes for the nonhuman animal rights movement than rights of nature, providing evidence in support of a transitional approach.

Rooted in Indigenous philosophies, the latter movement has been spurred on in multiple jurisdictions by its remedying of ineffective anthropocentric environmental protection laws. Taking anon-judicial route in most instances, a notion once thought absurd, natural objects being considered as persons is now a legal reality. The avoidance of roadblocks preventing the traditional approach reaching the same levels of success reflects the alternative transitional approach discussed.

Offering a similarly non-judicial route, this approach rectifies the shortfalls identified in this essay, using a model which establishes a legal basis for fundamental rights and animal personhood in simple rights. Instances where adoption of fundamental rights of nature has been rapid and absent pre-existing legal basis, appear to oppose the transitional approach. However, this can be explained when considering beneficiaries of the environmental protections.Interestingly, Ecuador presents a unique case supportive of the transitional model, extending the rights of nature to wild animals and accelerating the transition through the Alternative Animal Rights Pyramid.

While yet to be seen, with natural objects increasing legal visibility, jurisdictions at a similar stage in their rights of nature regime may follow with this step. However, until then, animal law scholars should reflect on the emphasis placed on legal personhood. This paper has demonstrated that this is nota precondition to rights and should not be treated as such if wanting to further progress the nonhuman animal rights movement. SOURCE…