The comparison between human slavery/genocide and the treatment of farmed animals has been met with major criticism on the basis that it trivializes human suffering. But in reality, the main difference is that the farmed animal is not even offered a life and only purpose is for consumption. In both cases however, the comparison not only manifests the power we humans have over other species, but also the power that one class of humans has over another.
AYESHA SAYEED: The comparison between the current treatment of nonhuman animals in modern-day industrial food production systems and instances of genocide and slavery has been greatly contested. It is a controversial subject that challenges hierarchical understandings of human-animal relations. Marjorie Spiegel’s ‘The Dreaded Comparison’ brought to the forefront an uncomfortable parallel between human slavery and the current treatment of nonhuman animals. Consequentially, Spiegel’s work received major criticism on the basis that it could be reductive of human suffering…
Identifying parallels of “othering” becomes beneficial to understanding not only animal mistreatment but also the exploitations of humans by other humans and the driving forces behind racism, sexism, and classism. Common to each of these is the “same basic essence… same basic relationship: that between oppressor and oppressed”. Highlighting these similarities allows us to better understand motivations behind atrocious deaths that affect all beings, human or not. This discourse is crucial in a world in which wars are waged on difference. Paying attention to the human and nonhuman animal divide allows us to better understand how difference is used in society and the power it holds to justify abhorrent behavior not only between species but between humans, each dependent on this relationship between the oppressor and oppressed…
The gap between the transformation of an animal as a being into meat is what Carol Adams terms as the “absent referent”. This draws specifically on the horrors of the slaughterhouse which are disguised at the later stages of consumption. Although people are aware that the animal must be killed in order to become food, little attention is paid to the stages at which this actually occurs. Instead consumers are presented with the end “product,” far removed from the life that once existed. Furthermore, there is a definitional shift, for instance cows become “beef” and pigs become “pork”. This lexical change shifts the understanding of what was once a life to a thing, a meal, a commodity. If the animals are considered as far removed from their initial life it becomes easier to see them as different, not as beings but as food, making it easier to justify their deaths…
Despite the many parallels, the comparison between slavery/genocide and nonhuman animal treatment has been met with major criticisms. This is on the basis that the comparison trivializes the suffering of humans through comparing their treatment to a species which is considered to be of lower value than humans. Sztybel challenges this by arguing that is the “objector’s trivializing of the interests of animals, and of their ongoing violation” that enables one to disregard the comparison. To minimalize the suffering of the subordinated is to belittle their pain and depict it as an absurd thing to question. To then build a comparison between the trivial animals and humans is depicted as an abhorrent comparison. He goes on to argue that declaring that the animal rights movement is a ‘bizarre exaggeration’ further minimizes the experiences of the animals and their mistreatment. This minimization allows the oppressors the opportunity to reduce compassion for the abused beings by depicting their suffering as trivial and therefore alien to human suffering. The only way that human suffering can appear trivial in comparison to animal suffering is based on the premise that animal suffering is trivial in the first place.
Furthermore, many argue that the justification for treating nonhuman animals as lower than humans is due to their reduced capacity for intelligence and rationality. And yet, even if this were be true, why is that being “better” in these ways justifies the exploitation of one species over another? To argue that an animal is only worthy of life depending on its capabilities is to deter from the core understanding of life, of valuing life regardless of its capacities. As Bailey goes on in her discussion of feminist vegetarianism, “Animals should not have to meet anthropocentric aesthetics or intellectual standards to deserve protection”. She likens this to the way in which animals don’t exist for people as much as women do not exist for men. Highlighting this parallel draws attention to the socially constructed rules that not only govern the relationship between species but within species. Essentially, a being should not exist for the purpose of another but for its own purpose, to live.
Discrimination toward animals based on a difference of categorical species has been termed as “speciesism,” much like racism draws on differences based on race. Common to both speciesism and racism is an underlying categorization of “us” and “them,” which sets in motion the ideological difference used to drive a division between groups. DeMello discusses the “borders” that are created in these processes of othering, that are based on “tenuous structure[s]… with arbitrary characteristics”; designed to create divisions between groups. These structures are not stringent but rather constructed of “fuzzy line[s]” that are constantly shifting and dependent on many contextual factors. This challenges the notion that hierarchical systems between humans and nonhuman animals are fixed and draws attention to the reasoning behind the divisions in the first place. Doing so welcomes a post-humanist position that allows us to unpack difference that is used as a tool for discrimination against all beings.
Ong’s discussion of the Tutsi people as “insects and vermin” further draws attention to the arbitrariness of the constructed human-animal divide. The fact that humans are given precedence over any other being is by constructing the subordinate “other” group as a nuisance, as unworthy. “Vermin” is used to depict rats and other creatures alike as a problem. Forcing humans into this category, according to this line of reasoning, strips them of any real quality. Ong’s example demonstrates how an arbitrary and constructed distinction, such as declaring a group of humans as “vermin” merited an atrocious genocide. This justification is similar to the way in which the difference between humans and animals is constructed; it is a “fuzzy line” that shifts depending on the motivation in the context. Currently this depicts nonhuman animals as lower than humans, condemned to death at an early age, bred only for consumption and made to live in atrocious conditions. Similar to the way in which many humans have historically been treated.
The fuzzy line is particularly noticeable in the division between farmed animals and pets. The fact that some nonhuman animals are considered to be worthy of love, care and attention, and are welcomed into the home becoming part of the human family, whilst others are simply food, begs the question: why? In many instances there are only marginal biological differences between, for instance, a cow and a dog, and yet one is condemned for consumption whilst another is received with love and recognition. Irvine states that the relationship between humans and pets in a domestic setting is “not simply the result of a natural affinity” but rather “a socially constructed practice” . She reiterates that the line between who we consider kin or food is constructed and dependent on the social context. Some argue that even pet keeping is a form of subordination of animals, in order to control them and maintain the power relation between humans and “other” animals. The main difference between industrial farming and pet keeping is that the former is not even offered a life and only purpose is for consumption. In both cases however, “the boundary not only manifests the power we humans have over other species, but also the power that one class (or gender) has over another”. This demonstrates the core similarities across the various exploitations, all waged on difference, whether that is race, sexuality, disability, or species. In all cases the difference is used as a justification for the exertion of power over the subordinate group. The human-animal relation provides a useful analysis of all subordinate groups that suffer from being oppressed by humans with significantly more power. Unpacking the flexibility of these constructed boundaries allows us to better understand how instances of genocide, slavery, and industrial farming methods are also justified.
Sztybel argues that many of these criticisms are built on misconceived ideas about the relationship between animals and humans. The basis for his response is that the issue of whether the comparison is offensive lies in whether “human dignity is violated by the comparison” in the first place. Again, this is based on the assumption that humans and nonhumans are valued differently and to make a comparison is absurd. To quote Spiegel, the comparison is “offensive only to the speciesist” who has “accepted the biased worldview of the master”. In this sense the dignity of humans would not be compromised if one were to recognize dignity in nonhuman animals. SOURCE…
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