For many vegans, the choices they make need not follow from a fully worked-out ethical imperative. Instead, it can be argued that they are acts of solidarity with and on behalf of others to resist injustice. Fundamentally, veganism connects wide-spread commitments regarding the moral status of animals to a duty to work toward the political and institutional transformations required to create societies without animal oppression; and hence toward societies without the label ‘veganism’.
ALISDAIR COCHRANE: Veganism is commonly described as the attempt to avoid, as far as possible, the exploitation and consumption of animals and animal products. While some people choose the plant-based diet associated with veganism for health or other self-interested reasons, the majority of philosophical work on the topic has been devoted to discussion of the ethical justification of veganism (i.e.,to ‘ethical veganism’). Some argue that it is a moral imperative if we take the rights or interests of animals seriously.
Others regard it as a necessity if we are to live up to our duties to live as sustainably as possible, or to minimize public health risks. Still others hold that it is supported by religious and spiritual reasons. These justifications are, of course, not mutually exclusive. And yet, others have questioned whether moral concern for animals really does entail a vegan diet… Still others have questioned the link between veganism and sustainability.
Furthermore, a small minority dismiss veganism because they reject the idea of our having moral duties to animals; while others accept moral duties to animals, but regard veganism as either too demanding, as having certain harmful consequences inits own right, not leading causally to the desired effects or, in turn, leading to moral overreach.
We argue that while these moral debates are important, they miss out a crucial feature of veganism: its political dimension. By referring to veganism as ‘political’ we primarily mean two things: that it addresses routine harms created by social structures and systems for which members of a political community are responsible in virtue of their connection to them; and that it is a form of activism to be conducted collectively, in solidarity, with others.
In making our case, we offer what we call a ‘normative reconstruction’ of veganism: an account of veganism which draws on its real-world practice, while developing it in certain normatively desirable directions.
To be clear, then, our aim is not to provide a descriptive account aimed at capturing all existing practices of veganism. Instead, our normative reconstruction seeks to offer reasons for us (vegans and non-vegans alike) to recognize and embrace the political dimension of veganism.
Crucially, this political account of veganism remains agnostic on questions concerning which ethical theory is true or what best explains the moral status of animals. Rather, it draws on the fact that support for the moral status of animals is widely accepted and now counts among the social values of most political communities, including those still exploiting animals systematically.
In our view, an important role of veganism is thus not to vie for moral right(eous)ness, but to highlight the discrepancy between these values and our political practice. Indeed, we claim that for many vegans, the consumption and other choices they make need not follow from a fully worked-out ethical imperative. Instead, and drawing on the work of Scholz, we argue that these are acts of solidarity with and on behalf of others to resist injustice.
Furthermore, we claim that this is a useful and fruitful way for individuals to conceive of veganism for (at least) three reasons. First, and this is the case made in the first part of the paper, it conceives of veganism as a form of activism, thus connecting it explicitly with its primary political end: to resist and overturn the oppression of non-human animals. Second, and this is the claim of the second part of the paper, it alters and expands the way we should conceive of the commitments of vegans. These can be grouped into commitments to other vegans, to non- human animals, to non- vegans, and to the political goal of veganism itself. And finally, and this is a point suggested throughout the paper, it means that some of the ethical debates around our duties to be vegan are rather beside the point.
Drawing on Iris Marion Young, we see our duties to overturn animal oppression as political and grounded in our ‘social connection’ to the injustice. Fundamentally, then, in our view, veganism connects wide-spread commitments regarding the moral status of animals to a duty to work toward the political and institutional transformations required to create societies without animal oppression; and hence toward societies without the label ‘veganism’. In other words, we regard veganism as a commitment to create societies in which individuals do not even need to consider whether they personally are morally obliged to avoid the exploitation and consumption of animals and animal products. SOURCE…
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