Just how far are ordinary people allowed to go to prevent animal abuse? Can they use force — and if so — how much? Could one even kill to save the life of a nonhuman? These thoughts evoke issues of public policy and precedent that are more ambiguous than one might expect. Punishing animal cruelty strengthens nonhuman rights and common justice. Today, bystanders should not be liable for reasonably protecting other animals from such abuse. If anything, the law should encourage these interventions by exculpation.
ROSS CAMPBELL: Lord Erskine, a chancellor of England in the nineteenth century and famous animal lover, once came across a man beating his horse and objected to the abuse. After the man exclaimed “can’t I do what I like with my own,” Erskine smacked him with his stick and replied “and so can I — this stick is my own.” Besides being an anecdote that would endear Erskine in the minds of activists for many years to come, this scenario evokes a curious question so far unanswered in the law: just how far are ordinary people allowed to go to prevent animal abuse? Can they use force — and if so— how much? Could one even kill to save the life of a nonhuman?
These thoughts evoke issues of public policy and precedent that are more ambiguous than one might expect… Punishing animal cruelty strengthens nonhuman rights and common justice. Today, bystanders should not be liable for reasonably protecting other animals from such abuse. If anything, the law should encourage these interventions by exculpation. This article outlines how existing legal doctrine can serve this end.
Three familiar defenses can be made to justify force here, though with varying mileage. A “defense of property” theory would be familiar to the traditional legal status of nonhumans. Yet this permission is ordinarily limited to property owners and non-deadly force, making it a less robust avenue of defense. The historical and lingering inconsistencies of treating other animals solely as items of property also point away from this regime. Instead, arguments may be made that at least in terms of their emerging protection from cruelty, nonhumans are legal persons.
Therefore, bystanders who enforce this right should argue that their actions fall under a more permissive theory of “defense of persons,” which has the benefit of allowing a wider range of actors and force. Likewise, appeals to the public good and lesser evil of using moderate force against animal abusers could allow an extension of the situational defense of “necessity.” In any event, due to the shocking nature and unfortunate prevalence of animal cruelty, a reasonable third-party permission to intervene should be discussed. SOURCE…
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