‘Nearveganism’ holds that individuals living under ordinary conditions in developed societies should organize their ordinary pattern of consumption around the moral considerations that support veganism. It therefore differs from strict veganism in recognizing that occasional departures from the ideal do not erase the moral significance of an otherwise overwhelmingly vegan pattern of life. At the same time, it differs from reducetarianism in requiring considerably more than marginal reductions in the consumption of animal products.
J.P. ANDREW: Despite decades of advocacy, strict vegetarianism and veganism remain minority practices in most developed countries, even as concern for animal welfare has increased substantially. If our overriding aim is to reduce the suffering endured by animals, then identifying the most effective way to move society toward the vegan ideal is a question of considerable practical importance.
Contemporary discussions of ethical consumption have largely answered this question in one of two ways. At one end of the spectrum lies an abolitionist approach that treats strict veganism as the only morally meaningful pattern of consumption. At the other lies reducetarianism, which rejects this binary picture by encouraging any reduction in the consumption of animal products, however modest. Both approaches, I believe, capture an important insight — yet both rest upon an overly simplistic conception of ethical consumption… The disagreement between abolitionists and reducetarians reflects a deeper disagreement about the structure of ethical consumption itself.
According to much contemporary vegan advocacy, one either is vegan or one is not. On this picture, veganism, under ordinary circumstances, is not merely the moral ideal: it is the only pattern of consumption that possesses independent moral significance; everything short of perfect compliance falls into a single residual category. One may be closer to or further from the ideal, but those differences are not themselves treated as morally important.
Reducetarianism rejects this binary picture, but it does so by lowering the threshold for moral significance. If every reduction in animal product consumption counts as meaningful moral progress, then ethical consumption risks becoming almost infinitely permissive.
Both views, I suggest, rest upon an overly simplistic conception of ethical consumption. The former assumes that moral significance begins only with perfect compliance. The latter suggests that virtually any movement in the right direction qualifies. But neither view captures the way moral evaluation ordinarily works…
Nearveganism holds that individuals living under ordinary conditions in developed societies should organize their ordinary pattern of consumption around the moral considerations that support veganism. It therefore differs from strict veganism in recognizing that occasional departures from the ideal do not erase the moral significance of an otherwise overwhelmingly vegan pattern of life. At the same time, it differs from reducetarianism in requiring considerably more than marginal reductions in the consumption of animal products. The relevant standard is not merely improvement, but substantial approximation.
Precisely where that threshold lies cannot be specified with mathematical precision, nor need it be. Moral concepts frequently admit of borderline cases. We cannot identify the precise point at which someone becomes generous rather than merely somewhat charitable, courageous rather than merely somewhat brave, or environmentally conscientious rather than merely somewhat concerned about the environment. Yet these concepts remain perfectly intelligible. The same is true here. Nearveganism describes a recognizable pattern of ethical consumption even if difficult cases remain at its margins.
What matters, then, is not isolated dietary choices viewed one at a time, but one’s overall pattern of consumption… Recognizing these degrees of ethical achievement does not weaken the case for veganism: on the contrary, it takes the moral ideal seriously enough to consider how imperfect human beings are most likely to move toward it. If our overriding concern is reducing the immense suffering inflicted upon animals, then substantial approximation to the vegan ideal deserves recognition as a morally serious form of ethical consumption. SOURCE
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