A common thread running through the animal rights movement is that once people learn about 'speciesism', a collective political action and anti-speciesist governance will logically ensue. Unfortunately, there seems to be widespread ignorance about this form of discrimination, an ignorance that amounts to more than a simple 'non-knowing'. In actuality, speciesist ignorance is structurally encouraged and maintains the dominant view in society. It is the speciesists' first line of defense, which allows them to comfortably remain ignorant of their participation in collective wrongdoings towards animals.
EMNEE VAN DEN BRANDELER: The concept of speciesism has played an important role in the field of animal ethics for delineating the moral status of animals. As first conceptualized by Richard Ryder — and later popularized by Peter Singer — speciesism is analogous to other –isms, such as sexism and racism. For the sake of my argument, I assume that speciesism is indeed a form of discrimination, and can therefore constitute a moral wrong. When discrimination among individuals happens on the basis of a morally superfluous trait — such as skin colour, sex, or cognitive intelligence — it is morally objectionable. Therefore, speciesism is best defined as ‘discrimination based on species membership’…
Many animal ethicists have argued that speciesism is a form of discrimination — one that is made on the basis of species membership. A common thread running through animal ethics and the animal rights movement is that once people recognize such speciesism, a trend towards collective political action and anti-speciesist governance will logically ensue. Unfortunately, there seems to be widespread ignorance about this form of discrimination — an ignorance, that amounts to more than a simple non-knowing. Peter Singer suggests that ‘[i]gnorance […] is the speciesist’s first line of defense. Yet it is easily breached by anyone with the time and determination to find out the truth’.
In order to adequately criticize sustained structural speciesism and injustices towards animals, I develop an epistemological account of ‘speciesist ignorance’. I begin by defining and distinguishing between individual and group-based accounts of speciesist ignorance. I argue that humans, taken as a group, enjoy a position of privilege, which allows them to comfortably remain ignorant of their participation in collective wrongdoings towards animals. Additionally, I point out that speciesist ignorance is structurally encouraged and thereby maintains the dominant view that the human-animal-relationship, as it stands, is just. In sum, this article lays the groundwork for a social epistemology of speciesist ignorance. In particular, it informs further debate about individual and institutional epistemic duties to inquire into speciesism and to inform the public, about the moral culpability of ignorant actions, and about effective animal advocacy and policy which actively rejects speciesist ignorance. SOURCE…
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